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Abstract
Authentication is an essential part of any network
and plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security of a
network by preventing unauthorised devices/users
access to the network. As dynamic wireless mesh
networks are evolving and being accepted in various
fields, there is a strong need to improve the security of
the network. It’s features like self-organizing and selfhealing make it great but get undermined when rigid
authentication schemes are used. We propose a hybrid
authentication scheme for such dynamic mesh
networks under three specified scenarios; full
authentication, quick authentication and new node
authentication. The proposed schemes are applied on
our previous works on dynamic mesh routing protocol,
Geo location Oriented Routing Protocol (GLOR
Simulation results show our proposed scheme is
efficient in terms of resource utilization as well as
defending against security threats.

1. Introduction
The mesh networks have evolved a great length in
the past few years and are being used extensively for
device to device communication. They feature a selfsustained network model where the data is transmitted
from one point to other by the concept of hopping. This
is achieved by connecting multiple devices together
and then sending the data from the host device to the
next device and repeating this process multiple times
until the data finally reaches the destination node. This
can be achieved through unicast/multicast routing
where a single or multiple path is used to send data or
by flooding the whole network with the data.
A typical mesh network can be either static or
dynamic, depending upon the type of connected
devices. If stationary/fixed devices form the mesh
network, it is known as a static mesh network. It can be
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wired, wireless or a combination of both depending
upon how devices connect to each other.
However, the dynamic mesh network is formed by
mobile/portable devices but at the same time supports
static devices as well. As the major part of the network
consists of mobile/portable devices, all the devices use
wireless communication to connect to each other.
Hence it is known as the dynamic wireless mesh
network and is a great platform for high performance
devices such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc.
The dynamic wireless mesh network is a recent
network type, which along with all the great features of
mesh networks also provides a potential to expand
easily. With a new network model custom-tailored for
it, the dynamic wireless mesh network can start as a
backup communication network that can work without
any expensive infrastructure and someday may become
a primary communication network.
The mesh network comprises of various noble
features such as self-configuration, which allows the
devices to connect and create the network without any
external control entity. It involves low operating costs
as the network is composed of user devices, which are
easily, setup by implementing an identical protocol on
all devices. The maintenance of the network can be
considered by the device owners while providing
robustness as multiple devices create redundant
connections. A dynamic size can adapt according to the
number of devices. In addition, the self-healing
properties also make wireless mesh networks ideal
network choice for future.
However, it is important to note that, mesh network
sometimes is unable to perform at its full potential as
the current/legacy protocols limit the extent of its
features and size [1]. Aspects such as IP addressing
requires a central server to manage the network which
makes the network dependent on the server destroying
its self-configuration properties [2].
As the mesh network works by sending data
through multiple devices, these devices have access to
the data flowing through the network [3]. This raises
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various security concerns as the network becomes
prone to even the simplest attacks such as
eavesdropping which can compromise the privacy of
the users and the integrity of the network.
Hence, along with various other network models,
security has also become a must for mesh networks
too. Recently, various security models have been
developed for the mesh network [1 - 22], however the
security models themselves have become another
factor prevents the mesh to expand. To provide high
levels of security, a central controller is used to
manage the network, which indecently prevents the
network from expanding and working at its true
potential.
In this paper, we present various related/existing
security schemes, how they implement authentication
and their limitations in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 defines
the problem statement whilst providing a summary on
the main challenges. Following that, the paper presents
briefly the Geo Location Oriented Routing (GLOR)
protocol and its current authentications scheme in
Section 3 and explains how we incorporate its new
features for the lightweight hybrid authentication
model. Section 4 presents our proposed authentication
scheme with various scenarios and how they work to
provide better security. Section 5 presents the
simulation results and analysis and finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 6.

2. Related Works and Problem Statement
The wireless mesh network is prone to various
types of threats ranging from basic attacks like Denial
of Service, Eavesdropping, Spoofing, Flooding, etc.,
all the way to much advanced attacks such as the
Sinkhole attack, Impersonation, Sybil attack, data
redirect, and many more [1,13]. In essence, most of the
attacks in mesh networks can be traced to a
compromised device or an unauthorised access to the
network. Hence authentication plays a crucial and
integral part preserving security of the network by
keeping the attackers away from accessing the
network.

2.1. Related works
The wireless mesh network has some well-known
routing techniques such as the OLSR (Optimized Link
State Routing) [8, 9, 10] and AODV (Ad hoc OnDemand Distance Vector) [12], both these schemes
have almost no security aspect by themselves but,
lately they have been modified to include security.
SOLSR is a secure version of the OLSR protocol
which uses features like message authentication codes

(MAC’s), timestamping and cryptographic signatures
to prevent the most common attacks on OSLR such as
identity spoofing, link spoofing, tc packet spoofing
[14].
Similarly, SAODV is a secure version of AODV
protocol which implements two mechanisms, digital
signatures [4] and hash chains, to provide security and
ensure the integrity of the network [15]. There are
various other protocols such as ARAN (Authenticate
Routing for Ad hoc Networks), which uses a single
trusted key pair for the whole network to ensure
security [16]. SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) [17],
SMT (Secure Message Transmission Protocol) [19]
and SAR (Security-Aware Ad Hoc Routing Protocol)
[20] use shared secret key amongst devices to verify
packets. Protocols like SEAD (Secure Efficient Ad
Hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol) [18] and SLSP
(Secure Link State Routing Protocol) [21] use tabledriven approach along with time-synchronization or
secret key exchange and other similar featured
protocols.
However, most security schemes are either based
on flooding technique, which increases the network
load on each device, or they require an existing
security association between the devices. Others such
as OLSR are known to self-saturate the network just by
overcrowding of Hello messages.
Hybrid Authentication is a must for multihop
networks as it can provide redundant ways in which a
device can authenticate itself or other devices [24, 25].
It is also certain that there is a need for an
authentication server to verify and keep a check on all
the authentications. At the same time, there must exist
other equally secure ways of authentication so that the
network can function even if the authentication server
is unreachable [26, 27]. A similar approach that
implements hybrid authentication is presented in [22]
which, discusses a multi-level model for
authentication. However, the model can only be
applied to static wireless mesh networks and not the
dynamic wireless mesh networks.

2.2. Problem Statement
The dynamic wireless mesh network requires a
dynamic security model comprising of a new
authentication scheme, which can adapt to various
scenarios and still be able to provide high levels of
security. As it is made up of mobile devices, which
keep switching connections as they move, a static
authentication scheme with rigid rules will slow down
the network.
In addition, a mobile device in the network might
not always have access to the authentication server and
will be unable to gain network access which will lead
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to a limited/fixed sized network, preventing its
expansion and network coverage.

3. The GLOR routing model
In our previous effort, we have developed the Geo
Location Oriented Routing (GLOR) protocol [2],
which is more suited for dynamic wireless mesh
networks [2]. The network model also provides a set of
new features that can be used to implement better
security in the network. Some of the new features of
the GLOR protocol are as follows:
Reverse Network Model: The devices that make
up the mesh network are self-maintained and
contribute resources to maintain the network as well
removing the need of centralised control.
New Addressing Scheme: As the name of the
protocol suggests, it uses geo-location as the address of
a device in place of the IP address.
Smart Packets: As the protocol uses geo-location,
a data packet equipped with the geo-location of its
destination can dynamically find a path through the
devices without mapping the whole network.
Security Model: The GLOR security model
includes basic authentication, monitoring and an endto-end encryption [23], which is achieved using
asymmetric encryption (Public – Private key pair) [10].
Web Register: It is defined as the “yellow pages”
of the GLOR network model and is responsible for
storing information like mac address, unique ID,
location, public encryption key, etc. for every
registered device on the network. Its purpose is to keep
records in the cloud that can be accessed for
authentication purposes and to provide device location
information for better routing efficiency.
Although the protocol provides an adequate
authentication scheme, it does not take into account the
various scenarios a new device can encounter during
the authentication process. With all the above features,
the GLOR protocol provides the required features and
the platform to be suitable for a new dynamic
authentication model. Hence, this paper builds upon
the existing work done by the authors [2, 3, 23].

4. Authentication Mechanism
The GLOR model presents a basic authentication
scheme [3], which is dependent on the web register for
verification of the device details. However, getting
access to the web register might not always be
possible. This can result in a long delay for the new
device to gain access to the network.
In addition, the authentication process requires the
devices to first establish a connection to the network

and is then authenticated which poses a security threat
to the network itself.
In order to make the authentication process faster
and much more secure, we propose three scenarios
which encapsulate all possible conditions a device can
encounter while establishing a connection to the
network. During authentication, the new device is kept
in a sandbox scenario, which prevents the new device to
discover any further details about the network. The new
device is not provided network access until the

authentication is successful. The three distinct
scenarios are described as following.
Full Authentication: In this scenario, a device is
reconnecting to the network and is authenticated by a
Node which, has a direct or indirect link to the web
register. On successful authentication, the network
device will grant the new device network access along
with the right to authenticate other devices.

Term

Table 1: List of Components
Component
Description

Node

Network
Device

A device with established
connection to the network
and
is
authorized
to
authenticate other devices.

Device

New
Device

A device which wishes to
join the network.

WR

Web
Register

A database that stores
network device information
such as Unique ID, MAC,
Address, Public Key, etc.

UID

Unique ID

ADDR

GeoLocation
Address

KPU

KPI

KCR

A unique identifier generated
and provided to each node by
the Web Register. It is linked
with each device’s MAC.
Physical
position
(two
dimensional) of the device
determined
through
its
latitude
and
longitude
coordinates

RSA-2048 based encryption
key
pair
used
for
authentication and End-toEnd encryption. Each device
Private Key gets its own key pair.
Public Key

AES-256 based encryption
Crypto Key key provided to each device
at registration.
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Fig. 2: Full Authentication Process

Fig. 1: Authentication Scenario Selection
Quick Authentication: In this scenario, the device is
reconnecting to the network and is authenticated by a
network device which does not possess a direct or
indirect link to the web register at the moment. In this
scenario, the network device itself carries out the
authentication. On successful authentication, the new
device is granted network access but not the right to
authenticate new devices until the network device has
verified the new device’s information with the web
register.
New Node Authentication: In this scenario, an
unregistered device (which has never connected to the

network) wants to join the network. For this scenario, it
is vital that the network device maintains a direct or
indirect access to the web register. This is required as
all the device information collected must be recorded
at the web register for pre-registration authentication
and the registration process.
Once the Node has collected enough information
about the Device, it decides upon the authentication
scenario to be used. The decision on which scenario
the device must pass through is based on the
availability of; the new device’s unique ID and access
to the web register as shown in Fig. 1. The presence of
UID implies that the new device has been registered
and is re-connecting to the network.
Table 1 lists various components of the hybrid
authentication model and associated terms used to
represent them.
The authentication scheme is based on challengeresponse technique and uses a mathematical equation
along with the encryption keys to verify the device. All
the encryption keys that are used during the
authentication process are stored in a TPM (Trusted
Platform Module) style device. Such device is then
used to prevent any unauthorized access to the
sensitive information if a device on the networks is
internally compromised. The authentication scenarios
are discussed in details below.
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Fig. 3: Quick Authentication Process

Fig. 4: Registration and New Node Authentication
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4.1. Scenario 1 – Full Authentication
The steps in full authentication process are divided
into four major parts: Handshake, Device Information
Collection, Challenge and Decision as shown in Fig. 2.
Individual processes are defined as follows.
Algorithm 1: Scenario-1 Challenge
KPI(D) - private key of D; KPU(D) - public key of D
VAR - Variable; OPR - Operator; RLT() – Result;
CLN - Challenge; RES – Response
1. Get device encryption key
Node requests WR for KPU(Device)
Node (Device(UID||MAC)) → WR
If WR found Device in the register and verified
WR → Node: (KPU(Device))
2. Create challenge
Node uses random function to generate equation
Node(Random) = VAR1, VAR2 & OPR1
Node checks if equation is valid
RLT(Node) = VAR1 OPR VAR2
If RLT(Computable) = True, Go To Step 3.
If RLT(Computable) = False, Repeat 2.
3. Send challenge
Node uses KPU(Device) to encrypt challenge and add
KPU(Node)
CLN = KPU(Device)[VAR1 OPR VAR2 || KPU(Node)]
Node → Device: (CLN)

4. Solve response
Device uses KPI(Device) to decrypt and solve
challenge
KPI(Device)[CLN] = VAR1 OPR VAR2 || KPU(Node)
RLT = VAR1 OPR VAR2
Device uses KPU(Node) to send the response
RES = KPU(Node)[RLT]
Device → Node: (RES)
5. Verify response
Node extracts the response using KPI(Node)
KPI(Node)[RES] = RLT(Device)
If RLT(Node) == RLT(Device), Grant Net Access &
Authentication Rights
Node (Device(Connected)) → WR
If RLT(Node) =! RLT(Device), Authentication Fail
Node (Device(Flagged)) → WR
Handshake: The very first step for the Device is to
scan its surroundings for devices using the GLOR
protocol. Once a Node (a device implementing the
GLOR protocol and being connected to the network) is
found, the Device will initiate a handshake request.
The Node will then respond to the request to
complete the handshake. Once the Handshake is over,

the Device requests the Node for network access,
which then initiates the authentication process.
Device Information Collection: Before the
authentication process begins, the Node must first
request the Device for its information including details
such as UID, MAC, ADDR, etc. The Device must then
provide the above-mentioned information to the Node
as these details play an important role in verifying the
status of the device.
The Node will first check if the Device has a UID
as it is only provided to registered devices. Once the
presence of UID has been verified, the device
information is forwarded to WR.
Algorithm 1 provides details on the creation and the
process of challenge-response used in scenario 1.
Challenge: Once WR receives the Device’s
information, it looks for the device records in its own
database by referring to the UID. Once the details are
found, they are compared with the Device’s details
provided by the Node. If the details match, the Device
is verified and web register sends the KPU(Device) to
the Node.
Upon receiving the KPU(Device), the Node will
then create a random mathematical challenge where
both the values and the operation will be chosen at
random (e.g. “10 ^ 4”, “74 / 3 * 4”, etc.). This
challenge will then be encrypted using the KPU(Device)
and sent across to the Device ensuring that only the
device that possesses the KPI(Device) (Stored in the
Trusted Platform Module) will be able to decrypt the
challenge and solve it.
To ensure there is no intrusion during the process,
the Node will also send along its own KPU(Node) so
that the challenge response is also encrypted. The
Device can now use KPI(Device) to decrypt the
challenge, solve the equation and use the KPU(Node) to
encrypt the result and send the response back.
Decision: Upon receiving the response from the
Device, the Node will decrypt the response with
KPI(Node) and check the result. Once the result is
verified, the Node will finally provide network access
to the Device along with the right to authenticate other
devices on the behalf of the network. The Node will
also send an update to the WR informing that the
Device has gone through the authentication process
and has been verified and provided network access.
The WR will update the ADDR and last seen
information in its records for the Device and enable the
right to authenticate. This will ensure no node can add
another Device until it has been verified by the WR.

4.2. Scenario 2 – Quick Authentication
Like the full authentication process, the quick
authentication process is also divided into four major
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parts: Handshake, Device Information Collection,
Challenge and Decision as shown in Fig. 3.
Handshake: This process is identical to the one
used in the previous scenario.
Device Information Collection: Before the
authentication process begins, the Node must first
request the Device for its information which, includes
details such as UID, MAC, ADDR, etc. The Device
must then provide the above-mentioned information to
the Node as these details play an important role in
verifying the device.
The Node will first check if the Device has a UID
as it is only provided to registered devices. Once the
presence of UID has been verified, the device checks if
it can access the WR.
Algorithm 2 presents the technical exchange that
takes place during this authentication process.
Algorithm 2: Scenario-2 Challenge
KCR - crypto key; VAR - Variable; OPR - Operator;
RLT() - Result; CLN - Challenge; RES - Response
1. Create challenge
Node uses random function to generate equation
Node(Random) = VAR1, VAR2 & OPR1
Node checks if equation is valid
RLT(Node) = VAR1 OPR VAR2
If RLT(Computable) = True, Go To Step 2.
If RLT(Computable) = False, Repeat 1.
2. Send challenge
Node uses KCR to encrypt challenge
CLN = KCR[VAR1 OPR VAR2]
Node → Device: (CLN)
3. Solve response
Device uses KCR to decrypt and solve challenge
KCR[CLN] = VAR1 OPR VAR2
RLT = VAR1 OPR VAR2
Device uses KCR to send the response
RES = KCR[RLT]
Device → Node: (RES)
4. Verify response
Node extracts the response using KCR
KCR[RES] = RLT(Device)
If RLT(Node) == RLT(Device), Grant Net Access
Wait for Connection → WR
Node (Device(UID||MAC||Connected)) → WR
If RLT(Node) =! RLT(Device), Authentication Fail
Wait for Connection → WR
Node (Device(UID||MAC||Flagged)) → WR
Challenge: As the WR is not available or times
out, the Node must follow the quick authentication
process. As the Node cannot receive the KPU(Device)

from the WR, it uses the GLOR KCR (a symmetric
encryption key).
The Node will create a random mathematical
challenge where both the values and the operation will
be chosen at random (e.g. “10 ^ 4”, “74 / 3 * 4”, etc.).
This challenge will then be encrypted using the KCR
and sent across to the Device, ensuring that once again
only a registered device will be able to decrypt the
challenge. This is possible because the KCR is only
provided to registered devices during their first
registration and is stored in a Trusted Platform Module
(which is known to be extremely secure) only to be
accessed by the GLOR protocol for encryption and
decryption purposes.
Decision: Upon receiving the response from the
Device, the Node will decrypt the response with the
KCR and check the result. Once the result is verified,
the Node will finally provide network access to the
Device. However, the Node will not provide the right
to authenticate other devices until a verification is done
by the WR. The Node will now wait for an access to
the WR and inform it once the connection is achieved
and the Device is verified and connected.
The WR will check the device information against
its records and if verified, it will provide the Device
with the right to authenticate other Devices on the
behalf of the network. The WR will also update the
ADDR and last seen information in its records.
This scenario introduces a new KCR (AES 256)
[11,12] which, provides an alternate method for
authentication if the WR is not available. The KCR
referred here as universal and is saved inside a trusted
platform module (or a trusted execution environment
for devices that do not possess the hardware). The KCR
can only be accessed by the GLOR protocol for
encryption-decryption purposes in case no immediate
access to the WR is available.
The Device can now use its KCR to decrypt the
challenge and solve it. Once solved the Device will
again use KCR to encrypt the result and send the
response back to the Node.

4.3. Scenario 3 – New Node Authentication
In this scenario, we take into account the device
that is connecting to the network for the first time
hence; it does not have any UID. In addition, the WR
will not also contain any record matching the Device's
information. Hence, a new record will be created as
shown in Fig. 4.
This scenario also incorporates the device
registration process as defined by GLOR [2]. The new
node authentication scenario is divided into four parts:
Handshake,
Device
Information
Collection,
Verification and Registration.
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Handshake: This process is identical to the one
used in the previous scenario.
Device Information Collection: Similar to the
previous scenarios, the Node first requests the Device
for its information. The Device must provide the
required information, however, unlike the first two
scenarios, it would not contain any UID. On verifying
that the Device does not possess a UID, the Node must
begin the registration process on it’s own.
Verification and Registration: Before the Device
can register; the Node must setup a secure connection
to the Device as well as the WR to verify the details
provided. To do so, the Device is asked to generate a
new key pair KPI(Device) and KPU(Device), from
which the KPI(Device) is submitted to the trusted
module and the KPU(Device) is shared with the Node.
Once the communication is secured, the Node will
send the data to the WR for verification.
The WR upon receiving the Device’s information
will check if any matching records exist to make sure
duplicate records are not found. If no duplicate records
are found, the WR will create a record for the Device
and generate a UID to map the device’s information.
The WR will then send the registration details to the
Node, which will pass it onto the Device.
Once this process is complete, the Device will be
provided network access by the Node and also given
the right to authenticate other devices on behalf of the
network.

•
•
•
•

None of the devices fail during the operation
Both devices have the capability to calculate its
Geo-Location (ADDR)
There is no data loss during transmission.
For scenario 1, the Node has a direct connection to
the WR

5.2. Results and Analysis
The simulation involves the Device starting the
authentication process by initiating the handshake with
the Node. The simulation then proceeds along as
defined in the scenarios. The simulation does not
involve Scenario 3 (New Node Authentication) as it is
an extension of full authentication and hence, would
have similar results.
Simulation is conducted separately for each
scenario and collecting information on transmission
time, CPU utilisation, and memory utilisation. This
provides us with valuable information about how the
network performs under different conditions.

5. Simulation and Results
The simulation for the authentication model using
GLOR protocol has been developed in Visual Studio
using C#. The machine used for simulation is powered
by a 6th Gen. Intel i7 (3.1 GHz) CPU and with 16GB
DDR3L RAM running Windows 10.

5.1. Environment Setup
The environment consists of two Smart Devices
(both implementing the GLOR protocol), one of which
being part of the network (Node) and the other
attempts to connect to the network (Device). The Web
Register (WR) is implemented using a local SQL
database. The Device and Node have been allocated a
maximum transmission speed of 11Mbps, which is an
average speed of transmission based on the oldest nonlegacy hardware still in use (Wi-Fi or Bluetooth). The
transmission and processing times are calculated based
on the processing power and transmission speed of the
devices.
For the simulation environment, we consider following
assumptions:

Fig. 5: Scenario 1 timeline
The simulation for Scenario 1 is conducted based
on the model description from Section 3.1. The
simulation starts with the devices authentication
process. We then capture the time taken for the
authentication process to complete. Fig. 5 displays a
timeline of the authentication process starting at 0
seconds and finishing at 3.3 seconds while mapping the
key tasks in between.
The authentication process begins once the
handshake is completed and is denoted by ‘0’ on the
time scale in Fig. 5 & 6. Once the node has created the
challenge it sends it to the device, the time taken until
this point is calculated and presented in the figure. The
next key task is calculated when the device receives the
response and addresses it. Finally, the authentication
process ends with the node verifying the response
received from the device and deciding whether to
provide access or not.
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Fig. 8. CPU usage

Fig. 6: Scenario 2 timeline
Similar to Scenario 1, the simulation for Scenario 2
is also conducted according to the process explained in
Section 3.2. This simulation is conducted without the
presence of the WR and uses the KCR for encryption
and decryption. Fig. 6 displays a timeline of the
authentication process starting at 0 seconds and
finishing at 0.34 seconds while mapping the key tasks
in between.
The performance analysis for Scenario 1 and 2
based on resource consumption is also conducted. Fig.
7 displays the memory consumption for both Scenario
1 and 2. Fig. 8 shows the CPU utilisation.
As we can see in the above figures, the full
authentication takes almost 3 seconds more than the
quick authentication. However, the presence of both
scenarios with their conditions together provides better
security for the network. In terms of the performance
analysis, both the scenarios have similar resource
utilisation, which is mainly required for encryption and
decryption purposes.

6. Conclusion and Future Work
Dynamic wireless mesh network is an emerging
technology in the area of self-sustained formation of
networks and holds key to evolve into next generation
communication network. However, it is limited only by
the static protocols and rigid security frameworks,
which are not suitable for the dynamic network.
The dynamic wireless mesh network requires new
protocols and security models that are flexible and can
adapt to various scenarios. The hybrid authentication
scheme presented in this paper is one such aspect,
which works according to the network rather than have
the network work according to it.
Along with the flexibility, the security model also
needs to use new methods to provide higher levels of
security as mesh networks are prone to various attacks
as discussed in Section 1. With more security schemes
along with new dynamic protocols like GLOR, we
hope, the dynamic wireless mesh network can become
better managed, more secured and scalable for the
future.
Our next challenge will be to incorporate the new
hybrid authentication mechanism along with other
security features of the GLOR security model and
implement in a real-world scenario. The observations
for further testing and implementation will also help in
revealing more areas that require attention and will
accordingly aid in the overall improvement of the
GLOR security model.
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